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Sustainably managing coupled ecological-economic systems requires not only an understanding of the 
environmental factors that aﬀect them, but also knowledge of the interactions and feedback cycles that 
operate between resource dynamics and activities attributable to human intervention. The socioeconomic 
dynamics, in turn, call for an investigation of the behavioural drivers behind human action. We argue that 
a multidisciplinary approach is needed in order to tackle the increasingly pressing and intertwined 
environmental challenges faced by modern societies. Academic contributions to climate change policy 
have been constrained by methodological and terminological differences, so we discuss how programs 
aimed at cross-disciplinary education and involvement in governance may help to unlock scholars' 
potential to propose new solutions. 
 
Dealing with climate change requires enhanced integration between ecology and economics, but such 
partnerships are also essential in addressing a wide range of challenges in achieving a sustainable future1. 
Many recipes for preserving the Earth’s climate from dangerous change have been proposed. The delayed 
damaging eﬀect of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and their transboundary nature (independently of 
the source, all emissions increase the world’s stock of concentrations) aggravate the problem. Hence 
prescriptions for addressing the global external cost arising from human activity are bound to be 
multifaceted and to rely on various instruments and methodologies. Traditional theories of collective 
action have until recently shed a pessimistic light on the prospects of self-organisation in limiting the use 
of communal resources to a sustainable level. This is in part due to Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons', 
whose policy implication was to rely on coercion in the form of either privatization or government 
intervention2,3. Although more recent work has demonstrated that under a wide range of circumstances, 
communities are able to self-restrain and avoid resource overexploitation4, global cooperation at the 
scale required to reduce emissions and decarbonise the economy may be difficult to sustain without 
sanctions. In fact, the present lack of a supranational institution for regulating global carbon emissions 
sets the stage for free-riding, i.e. individual countries have an incentive to delay curbing emissions and 
rely on the mitigation eﬀorts of others.  
Does this gloomy picture change when we shift attention from gradual global warming to abrupt 
changes in the climate system, i.e. drastic and potentially irreversible ecological shifts? The threat of an 
impending low-probability, high-impact disaster might be imagined to be a stimulus to mitigation eﬀorts.  
One might think that humanity would rise to the challenge of a rapid transition to a carbon-free economy 
once alerted by early warning signals such as the climate system has been providing us; but that has not 
been the case.  Inaction remains the norm, and delaying the economic costs of mitigation, while engaging 
in repeated rounds of negotiations without addressing the root causes of global warming, appears to be 
the norm. Even with agreement, 'solutions' might not be achievable. We may have already passed a 
critical threshold, such as the 350 parts per million by volume atmospheric CO2 required to safeguard 
polar ice sheets5. Even if we haven’t already crossed a planetary boundary for dangerous climatic change, 
we must still be able to identify future early warning signals and collectively agree on large-scale action in 
the face of incentives for individual countries to free-ride. Lastly, should a global agreement be struck in 
response to a perceived threat, uncertainty regarding the amount of time and the degree of eﬀort 
required to reverse course and contain atmospheric CO2 within a safe operating space will persist. 
Clearly, we need to develop and implement a framework for global cooperative action that is robust to 
structural scientific uncertainties (as well as to uncertainty about societal responses to mitigation 
policies). Collective action can resolve commons problems at smaller scales4,6; the challenge is in 
extending those principles to achieve enforceable agreements among nations towards a sustainable 
future7. 
 
Threshold uncertainty surfaces in the latest IPCC’s Summary for Policymakers8 . The authors state 
that:  
“There is high conﬁdence that sustained warming greater than some threshold would lead to the near-complete loss of the 
Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, causing a global mean sea level rise of up to 7 m. Current estimates indicate that the 
threshold is greater than about 1°C (low conﬁdence) but less than about 4°C (medium conﬁdence) global mean warming with 
respect to pre-industrial.” 
In sum, obstacles to climate cooperation are compounded by deep scientiﬁc uncertainty concerning 
the timing and magnitude of climate change impacts9,10. Avoiding a tipping point leading to catastrophic 
climate events is much more diﬃcult when its location is hard to pinpoint11, a feature that cannot be 
disregarded, given the recently reported plurality of thresholds for abrupt climate change5,12,13. 
Furthermore, the link between emissions and climate change is also subject to error propagation14, 
meaning that we cannot attribute with certainty an emergency to increases in climate radiative forcing.   
Yet, the evidence that long-lived global warming can be attributed to anthropogenic causes is strong8. 
 
 How can science inform the debate on reaching an international agreement to keep temperature 
increases within acceptable boundaries? More broadly, what type of science-society interface is 
conducive to better management of global environmental commons? A multidisciplinary eﬀort is needed 
to address policy-relevant problems and explore appropriate economic instruments to deal with present-
day environmental concerns15. The time is ripe for economists and ecologists, along with other physical 
and social scientists, to join eﬀort to analyse individual and collective behaviour with the lens that is most 
appropriate given the research question at hand, rather than within disciplinary boundaries16. The 
insular nature of the social sciences and their especially tenuous academic link with ecology and Earth 
sciences (Fig. 1), have hindered the study of coupled social-ecological systems. Progress has been made in 
bridging the gaps1,16-19, but collaborations across the sciences need to identify better the intertwined 
drivers of successful commons' management.  
Academic insularity is particularly troublesome for problems, such as climatic change, that are 
characterized by deep (often-irreducible) uncertainty. In similar circumstances of uncertainty, clinical 
evidence suggests that human judgment is subject to biases and limited diagnostic and predictive 
ability20. Reaching across the disciplines involved in complex problems may mitigate such problems and 
help remove obstacles to cooperation arising from misunderstandings and lack of dialogue (Table 1). On 
the other hand, disciplinary focus has traditionally been the norm due to at least two reasons: lower entry 
costs to researchers (once a set of skills has been acquired, it can be usefully used in other projects, 
without the same need to invest in new methods or in vocabulary for communicating with academics 
trained in other disciplines); and, partly for the same reasons, a reward system favouring work that is 
confined within disciplines (for instance, it is easier to assess the value of the latter, as a norm of 
acceptability is more likely to have been established than in the case of research than spans multiple 
subjects). Our aim here is to identify some theoretical tools that have effectively bridged gaps across the 
behavioural sciences, as well as opportunities for further integration. 
 
Figure 1: Insular Social Sciences. Ref. [99]’s hierarchical map of science, which splits scholarship by 
clustering 9.2 million journal citations from the 2007 Thomson-Reuters Journal Citation Report into four 
disciplines. Arrows indicate citation traﬃc for the most important links, with larger, darker arrows 
indicating higher citation volume.  
 
Common ground  
Ecology is concerned with complexity and non-equilibrium dynamics, and economic tools allow 
investigation of the anthropogenic impact on the environment beyond simple representative-agent 
models. “Evolutionary game theory has been credited for redeﬁning how institutions are integrated into 
the analysis, behavioural economics for shedding light on how rationality is treated and experimental 
economics for changing the way economists think about empirical work”21. The examples below show 
that while traditions are diﬀerent (environmental economics is grounded in the theory of optimization 
and externalities, whereas ecology tends to focus on systems as adaptive and path-dependent), the 
methods are compatible22. Similarly, the diﬀerent orientations to eﬃciency vs. stability are not mutually 
exclusive, and can often be reconciled. Indeed, the similar trade-offs between current performance and 
adaptability, exploitation and exploration, etc., are central themes across disciplines, from behavioural 
economics to the theory of life-history evolution, to consideration of the fundamental roles of mutation 
and recombination in evolution23.  
 
At the core, ecological systems are in many ways special cases of economic systems, and vice versa, with 
both featuring competition for resources, parasitism, exploitation and cooperation. Ecological and 
economic systems alike self-organize through selection among and transformational dynamics of the 
units that make them up, from individuals to larger ensembles.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
methods developed in one context can elucidate patterns and processes in the other; conversely, 
restricting attention to either the economic or the environmental system alone will inevitably bias the 
analysis by disregarding feedbacks between the two [24]. As Shogren and Crocker25 put it, in the context 
of species survival, "Assessing the risk to species and setting a minimum acceptable probability of 
survival are economic as well as biological problems."  
 
Evolutionary dynamics  
A prime example of overlap and complementarity is found in the literature on the evolution of 
cooperation26, in which methodology and approaches have flowed freely across disciplinary boundaries.  
For instance, adaptive schemes such as replicator dynamics have been used both by economists and 
biologists to study common-pool resources27,28. While equilibrium analysis is a principal tool for 
economists, evolutionary economics emphasizes non-equilibrium trajectories, without assuming that 
eﬃciency can be assessed in the absence of distributional metrics29. Here, we use the term 'evolution' to 
include a variety of mechanisms of change, whether genetic or behavioural in nature.  The methods of 
game theory, which have their roots in economics30, have been adapted and developed in the 
evolutionary theory literature31, and subsequently made their way back into economics in modified form.  
The synergies from such cross-fertilization should be a model for other approaches. 
Dynamical systems, game theory and tipping points  
Dynamical systems theory is the standard starting point for modelling temporal changes in ecological and 
economic systems32. Management approaches rely on the choice of functions or parameters in such 
models to optimize performance characteristics. However, when interacting agents are involved, 
optimization approaches give way to game theory, which can be used to analyse cooperation in global 
commons such as the climate, both theoretically and experimentally (e.g., in prisoner’s dilemma and 
public goods games11,33. Furthermore, the application of game theory to international environmental 
agreements has provided significant insights with respect to the provision of transboundary public goods, 
such as abatement of GHGs34.35.  
Attention to tipping points in dynamical systems enjoyed wide attention thanks to the popular book by 
Gladwell36, but the topic has long attracted scientific interest, from the successes of the theory of phase 
transitions in physics37 to the less successful program of catastrophe theory38,39. More recent work on 
critical transitions in a wide variety of dynamical systems addresses problems of fundamental importance 
across ecological and economic systems. This work holds the promise of providing methodology to 
anticipate transitions as well as to design principles that can help avoiding undesirable regime shifts, 
though again care must be exercised to avoid overreaching 40-42. Lakes can flip from oligotrophic to 
eutrophic states, vegetation systems from grasslands to forests, and financial systems from growth to 
recession or depression43,44.  Analogous transitions can also undermine (or enhance) regimes of 
cooperation regarding common-pool resources, presenting challenges for the management of the 
commons27,45,46.  This is a promising area for future collaboration between natural and social scientists. 
Agent-based models  
Traditional methods rely heavily on analytical techniques, and usually on numerical solutions.   In most 
cases, however, what can be done analytically is limited to models of reduced dimensionality, and such 
analyses must be complemented by simulations and agent-based modelling. These are useful adjuncts to 
parsimonious analytical eﬀorts that, while illuminating in the analysis of basic incentives, may not be best 
suited to investigate more complex interactions. The ability of an agent to win trust and reciprocate the 
eﬀorts of others is key to explaining cooperation. In the context of climate cooperation, Elinor Ostrom 
observed that agents at levels below the nation-state can also be important to international climate 
change policy 47. She and Vincent Ostrom suggested that the trust gained and lessons learned by many 
parallel actions, by agents at various scales (‘polycentric governance’), are more likely to bring about 
progress than is waiting for a comprehensive international treaty among states48.   
The techniques of agent-based models hold tremendous potential for investigating the interactions 
among large numbers of agents, and for the development of rules for scaling from the microscopic details 
of individual interactions to the emergent properties of large ensembles.  Building models with huge 
numbers of free parameters increases the uncertainty in prediction, making essential the development of 
approaches for achieving an appropriate 'statistical mechanics' for the interactions among large numbers 
of agents.  Traditionally, in fluid mechanics for example, moment closure and related methods are useful 
in this regard49, and newer methods are available when moment closure is too difficult50; to date, such 
approaches have received little attention in the social sciences (but see ref. 51). 
The problem of scale and emergence  
An essential area of complementarity between economics and ecology involves sustainable development 
and the physical dimensions of the economy52. At the core of sustainability issues are problems of 
distribution - of physical and biological properties across ecosystems and biomes, and of resource 
availability across individuals, nations, and time.  These challenges raise issues of organizational, 
temporal and spatial scale that cut across disciplines. Ecologists are concerned with scale, and emergent 
features of population dynamics and ecosystem robustness and resilience53,54. These concepts are implicit 
in the distinctions between micro- and macroeconomics, have been widely explored in some contexts in 
economics55, have inspired new subfields such as the 'new economic geography', and are drawing 
increasing attention in the economic literature56. Ecological models have long been incorporated in the 
theory of renewable resources in environmental economics57,58, and recently for the analysis of 
exhaustible resources59,60. These involve issues of scaling from individual incentives to system-wide 
consequences and back. Increasingly, linkages between local and global drivers need to be forecasted to 
account for such interdependencies. In the words of Barnosky and colleagues, "to minimize biological 
surprises that would adversely impact humanity, it is essential to improve biological forecasting by 
anticipating critical transitions that can emerge on a planetary scale and understanding how such global 
forcings cause local changes"61. We next review some recent academic advances that may help with the 
task. 
 
Recent trends  
Modern science is breaking strict disciplinary boundaries. The last decades have witnessed what some 
have termed the complexity revolution in economics21,62; it is asserted62 that  “modern economics can no 
longer usefully be described as ‘neoclassical’, but is much better described as complexity economics”, 
which “embraces rather than assumes away the complexities of social interaction.” Below we present 
some examples of progress along these lines that is already under way, focusing on tools and concepts 
that, while more mainstream in ecology and Earth sciences, have only recently surfaced in the social 
sciences.  
 
The economy as a complex system  
Economics has lately devoted much attention to threshold eﬀects in environmental responses to human 
activities. Much can be learned from ecology and the literature on regime shifts and early warning 
mechanisms40,41,46,61. Furthermore, the concept of robustness or resilience is highly relevant for ecological 
dynamics63, economy-environment dynamics64, as well as networked (interdependent) socioeconomic 
systems65,66. Progress has also been made towards finding unifying processes in biology. Brown's 
metabolic theory strives to present a unified theory of ‘‘biological processing of energy and materials’’ in 
ecosystems, enabling evaluation of anthropogenic pressure on the diversity of organisms, and more 
generally of the connection between the complex function played by individuals embedded in ecosystems 
and the drivers of individuals' functioning (such as temperature, size and abundance of nutrients)67. 
Metabolic theory inspired work in subjects as diverse as societal metabolism and urban metabolism, 
evidence that the once common paradigm of assuming away complexity in theoretical modelling in order 
to achieve analytical rigour needs not be the only one. Increased computing power at more affordable 
prices also means that fewer compromises need now be made when  modelling complex systems. 
 
Recent cross-disciplinary eﬀorts have started to tackle the complex interactions between human system 
and environmental systems. Measuring the ecosystem services provided by diﬀerent resources is a 
complex task 68, contributing to the under-pricing and unsustainable use of resources such as fresh water 
and the atmosphere as a carbon sink. To illustrate the need for dialogue among experts, let's briefly 
consider practical attempts to evaluate policies while accounting for coupled ecosystem and economic 
dynamics. These fall under the ’environmental impact assessment’ label, a “management tool which has 
the ultimate objective of providing decision-makers with an indication of the likely consequences of their 
decisions relating to new projects”69. Increased public discussion and participation of different sub-
national stakeholders are attractive features of this tool, but several drawbacks hinder its applicability. 
An important one is striking equilibrium between environmental and economic goals. Given the financial 
implications of environmental impact assessments that are frequently linked to the licensing of permits, a 
structured approach for weighing the costs and benefits of a project along both the environmental and 
social dimensions is needed to avoid the corruption (or disproportionate industry lobbying). Evidence 
from India suggests that when such balanced assessments are not in place, public discussions may be 
steered towards the least controversial criterion, and thus overlook potential reasons for aborting a 
project70. Accounting for the complexity of social and ecological systems, and the linkages between the 
two, could help mitigate this problem and contribute to more objective project evaluations across 
different criteria. 
Behavioural and experimental methods  
In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, conventional game theory using one-shot or repeated 
interactions predicts that the temptation to defect leads individuals to resource overuse, hence justifying 
Hardin’s prediction of the tragedy of the commons. In many situations, however, there is more to human 
behaviour than selﬁshness: ﬁndings from behavioural and experimental economics, as well as from 
neuroscience have argued that human choice is a social phenomenon71, and 'behavioural failures' are 
widespread72. Kahneman's research73 suggests that social norms and framing of options signiﬁcantly 
inﬂuence behaviour, with significant repercussions for human cooperation and resource exploitation. In 
particular, ethics and prosociality are increasingly relevant for ecologists and economists, as 
environmental sustainability is intrinsically linked to ethical considerations74.  
Diﬀusion through networks  
Behaviours and technologies diﬀuse through social interactions, with adoption by one agent increasing 
the likelihood that others will follow suit.  Network analysis can be useful in determining how the 
adoption and the speed of diﬀusion of green technologies or behaviours depend on social connections: 
mutually reinforcing choices can lead to accelerating diﬀusion75,76. Under these circumstances 
innovations may spread in a similar fashion to epidemics. Network topology has profound implications 
for the outcome of diffusion. Chung and colleagues, for instance, find that a norm of social sanction 
towards defectors who overharvest a shared resource is destabilised in loosely connected networks, 
whereas it supports cooperation in networks with high degree of connectedness77. Connectedness can 
also have adverse effects, as contagion can lead to mounting systemic risk, and the spread of destabilizing 
features through over-connected networks69.  
Cooperation across scales  
In light of the lack of progress by the international community in curbing GHG emissions, the question of 
whether local climate governance may be less riddled with barriers to cooperation than international 
agreements has been posed both in policy and academic spheres. Speciﬁcally, the hope is that loosely 
coordinated unilateral action by governments and industries would more eﬃciently deliver emissions 
reductions78: Will the prospect of acting as a leader in green technologies fuel a global ’green race’ among 
industries and countries79? Should policy-makers whose goal is to steer their economies away from fossil 
fuels then focus on subsidies to nascent green markets, rather than on achieving eﬃciency via taxation? 
The analysis of the interaction between bottom-up drivers of environmental management and the top-
down incentives arising from global architectures to curb GHG emissions has just begun47,80,81, and largely 
remains an empirical question. Behavioural and natural scientists could proﬁtably pool their respective 
expertise and develop a cross-disciplinary theory backed by cross-scale data, in order to shed light on 
how cooperation unfolds when mutually inﬂuenced local and global drivers are considered.  
 
Consider the debate in economics over the drivers of income variation across space, namely "the poorly 
understood fact that countries in temperate and colder regions have higher per capita output than most 
low-latitude and high-temperature regions"82. Nordhaus notes that much of the economic growth 
literature has been polarised in one of two camps, which either focus on geography or national 
institutions. The narrow focus on these two competing explanations, by failing to investigate the complex 
interaction between environment, wealth and norms, loses sight of important related questions 
pertaining to the evolution of institutions. For instance, why do we observe so much institutional 
variation across space? Models of group formation, such as those used in evolutionary biology83, 
augmented with environmental traits (e.g. climatic favourability), could be used to study the evolution of 
cooperative institutions under different combinations of environmental stressors and wealth availability. 
Again, seemingly unrelated disciplines provide inspirational clues for broadening the picture to include 
relevant insights. Social psychologist Van de Vliert has moved away from the view that either institutions 
or geography explain income distribution, by suggesting that trust and other cooperation-inducing 
cultural traits result from the combination of climate and affluence84.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasing degree of interdisciplinarity  
 
Economics 
Economics+ 
Evolutionary 
Biology 
   Economics+ Evolutionary 
Biology+    
   Other Behavioural Sciences 
Anticipated human 
responses to policy  
Allocation of 
resources through 
the (carbon) price 
signal will 
efficiently reduce 
global emissions  
Path dependency and 
myopic behaviour may 
lead to suboptimal 
mitigation trajectories. 
Punishment 
mechanisms are needed    
Financial incentives may 
discourage cooperative behaviour 
by crowding out perceptions of 
moral duty towards the common 
good. Fairness and ethics are as 
important as monetary incentives  
Anticipated 
ecosystem 
responses to 
human activity 
 
Ecological 
feedbacks are 
largely ignored in 
standard 
modelling, which 
focuses on 
strategic 
incentives and 
rational actors  
Increased greenhouse 
gas concentrations will 
alter several drivers of 
ecosystem processes 
(e.g. temperature and 
precipitation),with 
complex ecosystem 
responses 
The coupling of social and 
ecological processes implies that 
we should further consider the 
effects of the changing 
environment on individual and 
societal organisation. These 
include adaptation and the 
emergence of new norms 
Table 1: Reducing bias through disciplinary harmonization. Differences in anticipated effects of a stylised 
policy proposal to combat climate change through emission trading, when progressively breaking down research 
silos. 
 
Forward look 
 
Human socio-economic systems and the ecosystems on which they are dependent cannot be analysed in 
isolation, due to the inherent complexities and feedback processes operating across systems24. 
Furthermore, many of these processes exhibit nonlinearities; this means that ignoring feedback cycles 
and focusing on more tractable linear dynamics (as has traditionally been the case in economics 
modelling) may miss important and potentially irreversible patterns44,85. Some of the limitations of 
theoretical ecology and economics have been resolved within their respective frameworks, often by 
incorporating relevant insights from the other discipline. Focusing on the management of global 
environmental commons, we have identiﬁed topics where the bridging of the gap between the two 
scholarly foci has already begun, as well as areas that call for further integration.  
Climate change research is illustrative of the need for greater cross-disciplinary collaborations, 
because an assessment of the net economic and ecological damages occurring from alternative 
trajectories of anthropogenic interference with the climate system requires creatively merging insights 
and methodologies often developed autonomously. Consider solar radiation management, a 
geoengineering method aimed at reducing climate change. The impacts of solar radiation management 
pertain to both the ecological eﬀects of injecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere and the strategic 
incentives for action. Ecosystem impacts include direct eﬀects on the Earth’s radiation balance and key 
ecosystem drivers (e.g. reduced global temperature change compared to business-as-usual GHG 
emissions, decreased stratospheric ozone concentration and changed precipitation patterns), as well as 
indirect eﬀects86. Ecosystem responses of oceanic, freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems will be spatially 
heterogeneous and to a large extent unpredictable, creating potential winners and losers from large-scale 
geoengineering and redistribution issues87,88. A comprehensive treatment of this technology needs 
therefore to look at countries’ economic incentives for (possibly unilateral) deployment, and the 
associated distributional, governance and legitimacy issues 89.  
Our view is that a deep understanding of the economic stakes and incentives is a necessary but 
insufficient condition to foster cooperation and avoid wasting resources90. Given the meagre 
achievements of repeated rounds of climate negotiations in limiting emissions, it is time for a strategic 
rethink. Although we do not claim that academia can provide on its own the solutions to the problem of 
international climate cooperation (academic collaborations can also be seen as necessary requirements), 
integrating insights from across the disciplines can help in at least two ways. First, there is mounting 
evidence that individuals, and hence countries, base decisions on a wider set of determinants than 
efficiency, as prescribed by the rational actor model in neoclassical economics71-73. By proposing solutions 
that draw from and integrate creatively insights from a broad range of disciplines, academics can produce 
more accurate predictions of human responses to environmental policies such as those aimed at curbing 
emissions. Secondly, the complexity inherent in global environmental change requires that the proposed 
policies reflect an understanding of the linkages between social and ecological dynamics. A narrow focus 
on either in isolation will result in biased policies that fail to capture important feedbacks between 
human activity and ecosystems' response.  
 
We have focused on how scientific dialogue between economists and ecologists, and more broadly 
between behavioural and natural scientists, may contribute to propose new ways of fostering climate 
cooperation (see Table 1 for an example of the additional insights that interdisciplinary may contribute to 
policy problems such as the implications of a market for tradable CO2 emission permits). Naturally, we 
see the need for an effort at drawing from many more disciplines, with obvious candidates from the 
behavioural sciences being psychology and philosophy. Sandel highlights the risks of crowding out 
nonmarket norms of restraint when introducing market incentives such as tradable pollution rights for 
firms or carbon offsets for individuals91; ignoring ethical and psychological drivers may thus undermine 
the effectiveness of a policy seeking economic efficiency92. It has been argued that, similarly to what 
happened with the integration of astronomy, chemistry and physics, different behavioural disciplines 
should be unified to avoid the current incompatibility in modelling human behaviour. Gintis93 notes that 
"Each of the behavioral disciplines contributes strongly to understanding human behavior. Taken 
separately and at face value, however, they offer partial, conflicting, and incompatible models. […] Yet, 
recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the 
areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines."  
 
Such unification is in its infancy, but it as a necessary step to increase the policy relevance of academic 
work on environmental problems such as climate change, as well as to balance the analysis away from its 
current bias towards the rational actor model. To foster interdisciplinary thinking and reducing 
disciplinary 'firewalls', education should tackle the challenge early on, by actively engaging college 
students in the topic of climate change. McCright and colleagues15 suggest that problem-based learning is 
well suited to climate change education, and may be instrumental in promoting mental models that are 
appropriate to understand nonlinear, stochastic and dynamic climate phenomena. They stress the 
importance of enhancing multiple literacies (e.g. scientific, quantitative and climatic) of all students by 
developing curricula targeted to college students in science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM disciplines) as well as to non-STEM majors, "who also will need to make informed decisions about 
climate change as citizen stakeholders".  
 
Hands-on education and dissemination projects aimed at improving climate governance, by 
broadening stakeholder involvement in policy consultation and implementation, have recently sprung up 
around the world. The EU funded project LIFE: Environment and Climate Action has a budget for the 
period 2014-2020 of about €3.5 billion, of which almost a third is allocated to the sub-programme for 
climate action, which tackles the above objective through one of three priority areas, titled Climate 
Governance and Information [https://www.eutrainingsite.com/2014-2020.php?id=129#euf]. In the US, 
similar projects involving either interdisciplinary research on climate change education or its 
dissemination have been promoted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National 
Science Foundation and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Communications and 
Education Program15. At present, a large fraction of the important insights generated through academic 
research never trickles through to governance due to the limited academic incentives for greater policy 
involvement. Yet, projects such as the ones mentioned above are milestones for promoting direct 
involvement of faculty and students in policy formation and implementation, with great potential to 
favour exchange between academia and government bodies. 
 
What can we learn from the surveyed cross-disciplinary attempts at education and policy-relevant 
knowledge generation, with regard to handling complex social-ecological problems? Focusing on what is 
arguably the most challenging problem ever faced by humanity, sustaining ambitious international 
climate cooperation, we have attempted to identify ways in which academia could assist governance. 
Academics play a potentially instrumental role both as educators and as researchers. However, this 
potential is still underused due to academic insularity, both relative to the government and across the 
disciplines (Fig. 1). Policy relevance can be improved by working on the former: pooling expertise and 
reaching across disciplinary boundaries is well worth the eﬀort, as it will be instrumental in advancing 
practical solutions to the increasingly complex management of the global environmental commons. To 
this end, the field of ecological economics needs to further mature beyond the exchange of methods 
between natural and social scientists94. Increased computational power by affordable modern computers 
presents a great opportunity for tackling the added complexities of modelling coupled social-ecological 
systems, but to exploit it scholars must engage in the far-reaching collaborations needed to support 
model interaction across disciplines95.  
A number of issues top the list of those where substantive integrative partnerships will be fruitful. 
Given the spatial and temporal repercussions of global environmental problems, intra-generational 
equity concerns require that we deal with the distributional aspects of utility, and confront the challenge 
of aggregation across people and across nations. Inter-generational equity issues raise the spectre of 
discounting, where the issues are not just what rate to use but whether hyperbolic discounting is more 
appropriate96.  Moreover, once objective goals or guides for negotiation are agreed upon, we still need to 
decide how decisions about the future will be made democratically, and how cooperation can be reached 
in addressing the commons issues, and attaining a sustainable future for humanity.  The analytical 
methods that must be developed cross disciplines, blending techniques from evolutionary theory31,94, 
theory of voting97, collective decision-making 4, optimization 90, and game theory30,98. Linguistic and 
methodological barriers pose challenges to maintaining rigour in research collaborations. Yet the 
academic rewards and potential for more grounded and influential policy work should serve as an 
incentive to rise to the challenge. The time is ripe and there is momentum to build on. 
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